The Possibility of Altruism by Thomas Nagel

Author:Thomas Nagel
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2016-01-15T00:00:00+00:00

PART THREE

OBJECTIVE REASONS AND ALTRUISM

IX

ALTRUISM: THE INTUITIVE ISSUE

1. The problem of how, if at all, altruism is possible has much in common with the corresponding problem about prudence. By altruism I mean not abject self-sacrifice, but merely a willingness to act in consideration of the interests of other persons, without the need of ulterior motives.1 How is it possible that such considerations should motivate us at all? What sort of system, and what further intervening factors, are necessary in order to justify and to explain behaviour which has as its object the benefit of others? (As in the case of prudence, the problem can be treated without attempting to provide too fine an analysis of benefit and harm, happiness, unhappiness, pleasure, pain, or whatever the principal determinants, positive and negative, are to be. The question is not why these particular factors motivate, but how, given that they motivate in one way, they can also motivate in another—over time or across the gap between persons.)

The problem at this stage is not how the interests of others can motivate us to some specific policy of altruistic conduct, but how they can motivate us at all. Obviously some account of such behaviour is needed by most ethical theories, since there are few which do not include some requirements of other-regarding action. Even if the required social behaviour does not include serious self-sacrifice, it will almost certainly include cases in which no obviously self-interested motive is present, and in which some inconvenience or at least no benefit to the agent is likely to result. A defence of altruism in terms of self-interest is therefore unlikely to be successful. But there are other interests to which appeal may be made, including the indiscriminate general sentiments of sympathy or benevolence.

It is possible to argue against such hypotheses on the ground that the psychological and societal principles to which they appeal are neither universal nor obvious enough to account for the extent of altruistic motivation, and that they are evidently false to the phenomena.1 However, I prefer to concentrate instead on trying to provide a better account, thereby showing that an appeal to our interests or sentiments, to account for altruism, is superfluous. My general reply to such suggestions is that without question people may be motivated by benevolence, sympathy, love, redirected self-interest, and various other influences, on some of the occasions on which they pursue the interests of others, but that there is also something else, a motivation available when none of those are, and also operative when they are present, which has genuinely the status of a rational requirement on human conduct. There is in other words such a thing as pure altruism (though it may never occur in isolation from all other motives). It is the direct influence of one person’s interest on the actions of another, simply because in itself the interest of the former provides the latter with a reason to act. If any further internal factor can be said to interact

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